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I. Introduction
In 1965 Congress amended the Social Security Program in a number of
ways, including the establishment of the Social Security Student Benefit
Program. This program provided benefits for children of deceased, disabled
or retired workers, who were enrolled in college full—time and were not
married, through the semester including their 22nd birthday. As Table
indicates, the program grew to be a major financial aid program for college
students. In December of 1977 over 860,000 students, about one—eighth of
all full—time enrolled 18 to 21 year olds received such benefits, and by
December of 1981, the benefits averaged about $3,000 per year per student.
Indeed, at its peak in fiscal year 1981, about 20 percent of all federal
outlays on student assistance for higher education were channeled through
the program.1
By the mid—1970s the program had fallen into disfavor in Washington.
Critics of the program argued that it was no longer required because of
the growth of "needs—based" financial aid programs administered by the
Department of Education, that it had unfavorable income—distribution conse-
quences because it was not "needs—based" and because payments were not
limited to college costs nor contingent on satisfactory academic progress,
and that the growth of program costs contributed to the financial problems
of the Social Security trust fund.2 Ultimately the critics prevailed and
the program was terminated by Congress as part of the general budget
cutting actions of the Reagan Administration under the omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981. This Act reduced benefits for existing
recipients and, eliminated benefits for all students who entered college
after May 1, 1982.
2Somewhat surprisingly, in contrast to the debate that accompanies
most social programs, debate over the student benefit program focused on
its costs and almost totally ignored the possible effects of the program.3
Virtually nothing is known about how the program influenced potential
recipients' decisions to attend college, the quality of the education the
recipients received, the amount that recipients' families contributed to
the student's education, or recipients' in—school and summer employment.
This paper seeks to shed insights into some of these effects, using
data from the Social Security Administration's 1973 Survey of Student
Beneficiaries, the only national survey of participants in the program.
Although the program has been ended, such information is essential for
informed debate on the methods by which the federal government should sub-
sidize higher education.
The next section presents a simple conceptual model of family
decision—making that serves as the basis for our empirical research.
Section III describes the data we use and discusses some econometric
issues. Section IV presents our empirical results; it is followed by
some brief concluding remarks.
II. A Family Utility Maximization Model
Suppose that the utility function of a family with a college—age
child is given by the quasi—concave function
(1) U = U[C,Q,t] U,U2,U3 0
where C represents the parents' consumption, Q represents the quality
of the college that the child attends and t the time that the student
is not employed, while in college. Presumably the family derives positive
3marginal utility from increased consumption, from having the child attend
a higher quality institution (both for current consumption and investment
reasons), and from having the student work fewer hours while in college
(which would free up more time for study and participation in extra-
curricular activities).
The family seeks to maximize this utility function subject to a number
of constraints. First, parents' consumption is equal to their total income
(Y) minus their contribution to the student's college expenses (Xe).
(2) c=Y—x
Second, the total cost of the student's attending college, which is assuired
to be an incr€asing function of the quality of the college, (E(Q)), is
equal to the sum of the parental contribution, the student's own financial
contribution to his education (X5) and the total (S) of the scholarship
from the college and other subsidies, such as the social security payment,
that he receies.
(3) E(Q) = + x + S
Finally, the student's own contribution is determined by his wage rate (w)
multiplied by the number of hours he works during the summer and academic
year (t); the latter plus his rionwork time just exhausts the total time
available.4
(4) X = wt
(5) T=t +t
w n
The solution to this maximization problem can be written, in general,
as
4(6) = x(SYw)
Q = Q(S,Y,w)
t = t (S,Y,w).n n
That is, the parental contribution to the child's education, the quality
of the college chosen, and the student's nonwork time (and hence part—time
employment) simultaneously depend upon the parents' income, the student's
wage rate and the total subsidy the student receives for attending college.
At this level of generality, one can unfortunately not obtain
unambiguous qualitative predictions from the model. However, if one assumes
that the utility function is Cobb—Douglas and that the total costs of
attending college function is linear in college quality, it is straight-
forward to show that an increase in the subsidy, S, should lead to a
decrease in parental contributions, an increase in the quality of the
college attended and a decrease in student employment (an increase in t).
Similarly, an increase in family income, Y, should increase parental
contributions, increase college quality and decrease a student's work-
effort. Finally, an increase in the wage rate should decrease parental
contributions and increase college quality; its effect on student employment
is still ambiguous and depends on the strength of income and substitution
effects.
III. Data and Econometric Issues
Data from the 1973 Survey of Student Beneficiaries, the only national
survey of participants in the program, is used below along with our
analytic framework, to analyze what some of the effects of the program
were. This survey contained data for 2,932 student beneficiaries, o.
5which approximately 72 percent were enrolled in 2 or 4 year colleges.
The remainder were 19 year olds still enrolled in high school or were
enrolled in vocational or trade schools. The 2,077 individuals enrolled
in two or four year colleges from the sample used in our analyses.5
The survey contains explicit information on the family's annual con-
tribution to the cost of the studentts education 2' as well as three
measures of the student's work—effort, total annual labor earnings (Y3),
total hours worked during the academic year (Y4) and total hours worked
during the summer (Y5). In the absence of information on the quality of
the college attended, we use as a proxy the net cost of the student's edu-
cation (Y1) ——the total annual cost of the student's education (tuition,
room and board, books, travel, etc.) less all forms of scholarship aid
the student received except social security.6
Explanatory variables contained in the empirical model are a vector
of family—specific variables that are meant to control for the family's
"ability to pay" for the student's education (family income, value of th€
family home, family receipt of welfare benefits, number of siblings,
presence of less than two parents in the household), family taste for
education (student race, sex, and age, and parents' education), the
student's academic ability (high school grade point average and whether
the student was 16 or younger when graduated from high school), and area—
specific variables to control for lirriitationson the student's employment
opportunities (state unemployment rate) and his or her access to both public
and private educational opportunities (public and private college tuition
levels and enrollment in the state). A complete list of explanatory variables
and their sources is found in Table 2.
6The variable of prime importance, however, is the student's social
security benefit level. Now the reported student social security benefit
level varies across recipients, creating a form of natural experiment,
because of differences in the lifetime earnings in covered employment of
the parent and/or because families with more than one child receiving
benefits often had their total benefits constrained by the program's
8
"family—maximum" rule. In the latter case, the marginal social security
benefit payment that the family received when the student beneficiary
enrolled in college is not equal to the reported (by the Social Security
Administration or the family) benefit that he or she received; the latter
is simply the average benefit received by each child recipient in the
family including the student. Indeed, in the case where a family is
already at the maximum because of benefits being paid to a number of child
beneficiaries under age 18, the marginal family social security benefits
that accrue when a 19 to 22 year old child enrolls in school is zero.
As a result, in our empirical work we experiment with several different
measures of the net social security benefits received by the family from
the student benefit program. The first two are our estimates of the
marginal social security benefits the family actually receives from
having the student enrolled in college (S1), or from having the student
and some of his other siblings aged 18 to 21 enrolled in college (S2).
These measures were calculated using an algorithm we developed based upon
9program rules and knowledge of various characteristics of the family.
The third is the family's estimate of the difference in total family
income due to the student's social security benefit payment (S3).
Finally, we use Social Security Administration administTative data on the
7maximum benefit level the student is eligible for (S4); this would be
the benefit level actually received in the absence of a family maximum
limit. While in "theory" the true marginal measures (S1 and S2)
should perform best, the measure(s) families actually base decisions on
is an open question.
Before turning to the empirical results, it is worth stressing that
all of the individuals in the sample are potential social security student
beneficiaries who have chosen to be actually beneficiaries by attending
colleges. There is no information in the sample on individuals who were
eligible for the program but chose not to attend college. Thus, without
further assumptions, one cannot directly estimate what the effect of the
program was on students' decisions to attend college. Our estimates of
the various outcome equations may also be subject to a form of selection
bias; we may confound the effect of the social security benefit level on
parental contributions, the cost of the college attended, and students'
part—time employment, with the effect of the potential benefit level on
the college enrollment decision.'0
In the absence of any data on eligible individuals who choose not to
enroll in college, it is difficult to control for this form of selection
bias. However, if one is willing to specify a set of variables and a func—
tional form for a "decision to enroll" equation, as well as a statistical
distribution for the joint distribution of the error terms across this
and the other equations in (6), then a recently developed maximum likeli-
hood procedure can be used to get consistent estimates of the effect of
social security student benefit levels on both the decision to enroll in
college and the outcomes in (6)h1 Estimates derived front this method are
8very sensitive to the specific assumptions made and in the absence of any
strong theory which would permit us to exclude any explanatory variables
from either the "decision to enroll" or other equations, it proved impossible
for us to obtain stable parameter estimates when we applied it.
IV, Empirical Results
Table 2 presents OLS estimates of the net expenditure on education
(Y1) and family contribution to education (Y2) equations, as well as
Tobit estimates of the student recipients' annual earnings (Y3). in—school
employment hours (Y4) and summer employment hours (Y5) equations, for
the entire sample, when S1 is used as the social security program vari-
able. Tobit is used in the latter three cases because of the large number
of students with zero work experience and earnings.
Although the control variables (theX') are not of primary interest
to us, those coefficients that are statistically significant often (but
not always) accord with out prior expectations. For example, white
recipients tend to work more than nonwhite recipients, and male recipients
work more than female recipients. Higher parent education levels lead to
greater parental contributions to their children's education and, in the
case of mother's education, to greater expenditures on college and less
student employment. The greater the number of siblings, the smaller the
family contribution and the more the student works while in school.
Finally, the distribution of public and private college enrollment oppor-
tunities in the state in which the student's family resides clearly
matters. Other things equal, an increase in public (private) enrollment
opportunities leads to lower (higher) expenditures on education and
parental contributions and lower (higher) student academic year employmont.'2
9Turning to the marginal social security benefit variable, Si,
Table 1 suggests that it significantly influences only recipient students'
in—school employment, with higher benefit levels leading to a reduction in
work—effort. The mean monthly marginal benefit level in this sample was
$53, which implies given the Tobit coefficient of —.238, that in the absence
of any benefits, the typical recipient would have worked a total of 7.5 hours
more during the school year. This is clearly not a substantial effect.
Substituting the other measures of social security benefits does not
provide any evidence of other substantial program effects. The top panel
of Table 3 shows the coefficients of the four different social security
variables from equations identical to those reported in Table 2, save
that the alternative measures were used. This table suggests that both
the family's estimate of the increase in its income due to the student's
program benefits (S3) and the maximum benefit amount the student could
have received (S4) are positively associated with the net cost of educa-
tion and the family's contribution to the student's educational expenses;
the latter a seemingly perverse result (but see below).
But here, again the magnitudes are small. For example, given a mean
value for S3 of $110 per month in the sample, the estimates suggest that in
the absence of the program, the net cost of the student's education would
decline by roughly $9.50 a month and the family's contribution by $9.02
13
a month. Statistical significance obviously does not imply policy
significance; the net effect of the student benefits appears to be pri-
marily an income transfer to the student and his or her family.
We should note, however, that when the sample is stratified by
whether the student attended a public or private college, a slightly
different picture emerges.14 The second and third panels of Table 3
10
present the coefficients of the various social security benefit measures
from these equations. For recipients, who attend public colleges, roughly
70 percent of the sample, the various measures of social security benefits
appear to be totally unrelated to the students' net cost of education,
their parents' contribution to their education and their work—effort.
In contrast, for the smaller sample of recipients who attend private
institutions, the evidence seems to suggest that higher student benefits
lead to higher net expenditures on education, higher parental contribu-
tions to recipients' education and lower student in—school employment.
Moreover, the magnitudes of these effects are often double the ones ob-
served in the overall sample.
IV, Concluding Remarks
Our study suggests the following tentaLive conclusions: The Social
Security Student Benefit Program did not appear in our sample to influence
students' decisions as to whether to attend public or private colleges ('see
footnote 14). Within the group that attended public institutions, benefLt
levels did not affect the net costs of education, primarily we expect,
because tuition levels in public institutions do not vary much within a
state and most students who attend public institutions stay in their "home."
state.'5 Surprisingly, the benefits also appear not to influence parental
contributions or student employment levels.
In contrast, for the students who attend private institutions, the
program appears to have had more effects (although in a quantitative sense
these effects are still quite small). In this sector, there is a wide
variety of colleges offering a range of tuition—quality combinations. Higher
benefit levels permit families to "stretch" to afford higher quality—higher
11
cost institutions; as a result both net expenditures on education and
parents' contribution to college costs increase. Moreover, because students'
nonwork time is valued, higher benefit levels do lead to a reduction in
their in—school and/or summer hours of employment. Viewed in this way, the
positive association observed between parental contributions and student
social security benefit level appears to be less of an anomaly.
Of course, all of the above results were obtained for data from a
sample of recipients who, by definition, must attend college. The absence
of data on potential recipients who choose not to attend college has pre-
vented us from analyzing whether the program influences the decision to
enroll in any college (potentially the most important effect) and leaves
open the possibility, as noted above, that our estimates are subject to
selectivity bias. Nonetheless, given the growth of needs—based financial
aid programs, the evidence presented here at least provisionally supports
the view that the decision to eliminate the program made sense.
Table 1
Social Security Student Benefit Program Statistics
Number of Benefits Paid in
Recipients in December of Year Monthly
Year December of Year (millions) Benefit/Recipient
1965 205,677 $ 13.725 $ 66.73
1966 375,873 24.000 63.85
1967 427,267 27.449 64.24
1968 474,056 34.243 72.23
1969 498,015 36.027 72.34
1970 537,170 44.672 83.16
1971 583,374 53.406 91.55
1972 634,481 69.616 109.72
1973 651,540 72.612 111.45
1974 679,101 84.715 124.74
1975 774,261 104.561 135.05
1976 834,718 121.09 145.03
1977 869,184 135.687 156.10
1978 817,506 139.944 171.18
1979 793,194 153.913 194.00
1980 733,758 167.233 227.91
1981 760,508 196.702 258.64
1982 476,325 108.483 227.75
1983 293.489 59.764 203.63
Source: Authors' calculations from:
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
96th Congress. Review of Social Security Student Benefit
Program (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1979) and various issues
of the Social Security Bulletin.
Table 2
The Social Security Student Benefit Progrem
and College Costs, Parental Contribution, and Students' Employment
(standard errors)
Yl
[OLS] [OLS]
'4
(Tobit] [Tobit) (Tobt1
Dependent Variables
(Estimation ethod]
Independent Variables
xl
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
x1o
xl'
x12
x13
x14
xis
x's
x'7
6.276
(86.79)
39.735
(80.01)
395.092*
(83.20)
215.261*
(38.70)
109.980*
(23.87)
27.945
(52.98)
54.630
(48.69)
427.039*
(50.03)
21.547
(16.44)
115.420*
(14.18)
97.897*
(24.13)
73.056*
(22.17)
38.145**
(22.82)
2.567
(7.48)
6.464
(6.45)
.982
(9.27)
23.525*
(8.51)
—11.923
(8.77)
—1.933
(2.89)
—2.994
(12.50
36.407*
(11.16)
28.723*
(10,22) (10.54) (3.44)
—3.805
(3.01)
.031
(.005)
.036
(.005)
.00757
(.00469)
—.00544
(.0021)
.0040*
(.0013)
191.82*
(46.86)
111.225*
(43.21)
—48.254
(44.22) (14.77)
8.207
(12.57)
10.695*
(1.76)
8.648
(1.62) (1.67)
—1.. 776*
(.62)
—.722
(.47)
.345
(1.89)
—1.602
(1.73)
3.875*
(1.78)
1.514*
(.58)
—.157
(.50)
10.204
(56.98)
—32.914
(52.71)
13.237
(54.61)
—7.303
(21.20)
20.777
(15.35)
(.02) (.02) (.012)
.00595
(.0063) (.0055)
1.066*
(.19)
.413*
(.18)
•397*
(.18)
.116*
(.059)
.099
(.051)
—193.585
(144.33)
17.053
(132.30)
—100.540
(136.55) (43.39)
—18.548
(39.20)
(24.01) (22.18)
53,375*
(22.53)
43•947*
(7.50)
7.080
(6.46)
.713
(141.26)
—84.733
(129.93)
—134.209
(134.92) (45.77)
—23.402
(38.02)
—57.977
(68.01)
100.956
(62.30)
26.011
(64.124)
22.46
(21.10)
—1.590
(18.24)
—119.520
(268.82)
—229.811
(252.74)
—55.777
(253.22)
—54.508
(85.22)
—34.973
(71.86)
.319
(.46)
.113
(.42)
—.497
(.435) (.144)
—.118
(.124)
.17 .18
S1
R2
log likelihood —13278.9 —7155.29 —10094.2
N 1938 1915 1938 1927 1917
from zero at .0 (.10) 1ev1;*(**) Coetficicnt statistically significant
two—tail asymptotic t test.
Table 2 (continued)
Variable Definitions
net expenditure on education (total cost—financial aid) per month
family contribution to cost of student's education per month
student earnings during year
Y4 total hours student worked during the school year
total hours student worked during the summer
race; 1white, O=other
sex; 1male, O=female
= age
father's education in years
= mother's education in years
family income
student's high school CPA
value of family's home (if owned)
= state unemployment rate
= average private tuition/average public tuition level in the state
X11 public enrollment (per capita) in higher education institutions in the state
private enrollment (per capita) in higher education institutions in the state
1 if family received welfare, 0 otherwise
X14
number of siblings of the student
X15
1 If mother absent from household, 0 otherwise
1 if father absent from household, 0 otherwise
I if the student was 16 or younger when graduated from high school, 0 otherwise
S1 marginal social security benefits
Also Included as explanatory variables were dummy variables for nonreporting of
X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, as well as an intercept term.
Sources:
1) Authors' calculations from the Social Security Administration 1973 Survey
Student Beneficiaries data file (Y1 to Y, X1 to X8, X13 to X17,
2) U.S. Department of Labor, 1980_Er.iplovtnent and_Trai Report of the President
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960) (X9).
3) U.S. Office of EducatIon, 1973 Dic;t of Educational Statistics (washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1973) (X11, N12).
4) U.S. Office of Education, Ba Ic Student Char sfor Hcher1ucat
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973) (N10).
Table 3
Sensitivity of Results to Definition of Social Security
Variable and Sample: Estimated Coefficients and
Absolute Values of Asymptotic t Statisticsa
Dependent VariableSocial Security
Variable 1 3 4 5
SAMPLE
Overall
1 .319 (0.7) .065 (0.2) —.497 (1.1) —.238 (1.7)** —.118 (1.0)
S2 .492 (1.4) .091 (0.3) —.365 (1.1) —.146 (1.3) —.111 (1.2)
S3 .086 (2.0) .082 (2.1)* —.060 (1.5) —.099 (0.7) —.180 (1.6)
S4 .127 (1.6) .162 (2.2)* —.068 (0.9) —.018 (0.7) —.027 (1.3)
Public
Si .045 (0.1) .011 (0.0) —.252 (0.5) —.096 (0.5) —.080 (0.5)
S2 .068 (0.2) .094 (0.3) —.238 (0.6) —.173 (1.3) —.062 (0.5)
S3 .024 (0.5) .065 (1.6) —.060 (1.2) —.026 (1.5) —.020 (1.4)
S4 .075 (0.9) .119 (1.6) —.060 (0.6) —.051 (1.6) —.05 (1.3)
Private
S1 1.104 (1.1) .409 (0.4) —1.050 (1.4) —.495 (1.8)** —.211 (1.0)
S2 1.510 (2.0)* .304 (0.4) —.794 (1.4) —.157 (0.7) —.260 (i.7)**
S3 .215 (2.4)* .156 (1.9)* —.092 (1.3) —.014 (0.6) —.016 (0.8)
S4 .261 (1.6) .291 (1.9)* —.114 (0.9) —.088 (1.9)** —.004 (0.1)
aAbsolute value of asymptotic t statistics are in parentheses.
where: Y1 to are defined in Table 1.
and: S1 = authors' calculations of the marginal social security benefits the family
receives from tile student being enrolled in school
S2 = authors' calculations of the marginal social security benefits the family
receives from all the students (age 18 to 21 in the family) being enrolled
in school
S3 = family's estimate of the difference in total family income because of the
student's social security benefit payments
S4 = social security administration reporting of the student's maximum benefit
amount
*(**) Coefficient statistically significant from zero at .05 (.10) level; two—tail
asymptotic t test.
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Footnotes
1. See John Palmer and Isabel Sawhill (1982), Table 11.3.
2. See, for example, Committee on Ways and Means (1979), Comptroller
General of the United States (1979) and Congressional Budget Office (1977).
3. The only analyses of program effects are descriptive tabulations
relating to the characteristics of recipients. See, for example, Robert
Hastings (1978) and Hastings and Phillip Springer (1976).
4. Although we do not pursue it here, the model can be extended to make
the scholarship the student receives from institutional sources endogenously
determined by factors like a student's ability, family income, the costs of
the institution, and federal aid policies. On this, see Winship Fuller,
Charles Manski and David Wise (1982), Appendix A.
5. Actual sample sizes are somewhat smaller due to missing data.
6. This proxy is obviously subject to considerable measurement errcr.
If one knew the name of the college the student attended, one could use the
average SAT scores of entering freshman or the Cass and Birnbaum (1981) rating
of the college as a measure of college quality. Sadly, however, this infcrma—
tion is not available in the data. An alternative is to use tuition or gross
costs of education as a proxy. While more selective private colleges do tend
to charge higher tuitions than less selective private colleges (results
available from the authors upon request), this relationship breaks down once
one considers only public colleges, or all colleges together. Our use of net
cost is meant to capture the notion that families will increase their net
expenditures only if they perceive they are buying a "better" product. In
any case, when tuition was used as a measure of quality for the students who
attended private colleges, results similar to those reported below were
obtained.
F2
7. Wage rate data was reported only by a subset of the recipients who
worked. Rather than imputing market wages to nonreporters and those who did
not work using a sample selection bias approach (see James Heck.man (1979)),
we follow the strategy of simply omitting the wage variable from the model.
Including it, along with a dummy variable for nonreporting of wages, never
substantially altered any of the other coefficients that we report below.
8. The family maximum is approximately 175% of the primary insurance
amount of the retired, deceased, or disabled worker (the latter's "normal"
benefit amount). It is estimated that over 40% of student beneficiaries
received reduced benefits due to this rule (Congressional Budget Office
(1977)).
9. See Rebecca Luzadis (1983), Chapter 5, Figure 1, for a detailed
description of the algorithm.
10. See Fieckman (1979).
11. See David Bloom and Mark Killingsworth (1984, forthcoming). We
are grateful to William Green for his attempts to generalize and implement
this method for us.
12. The coefficients of these X variables were virtually unchanged
when different specifications of the social security variable were used and/or
the students' wage rates were included in the model (see footnote 7). In the
latter case, higher student wages led to lower parental contributions, and
student work—effort, but higher student earnings; results which are all
consistent with our underlying framework.
13. The former is (.086) (—110),while the latter is (.082) (—110).
F3
14. Although not reported here for brevity, prohit probability of
enrolling in a public (as opposed to a private) institution were also estimated
for these recipients. The only variables that seemed to matter here were
public and private enrollments in higher education in the state. In particular,
none of the measures of social security benefit levels significantly affected
the public/private decision.
15. We should note, however, that even within the public sector many
students have the option of living at home or going away to college. Holding
tuition constant, costs would obviously be lower for commuters.
